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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CURTIS J. BELLER,
Petitioner/Appellant and
Cross-Appellee,
Case No. 20060641-CA

NANETTE ROLFE, Director, Utah State
Driver License Division,
Respondent/Appellee
and Cross-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal and cross-appeal from a final judgment and order of the Third
District Court after de novo judicial review, under Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-14 and -15
(West 2004), of the final agency action taken by the Driver License Division following
an informal adjudication. See Judgment, Addendum A. Jurisdiction is conferred upon
this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Curtis Beller was arrested for driving his motorcycle while under the influence of
alcohol on July 1, 2005, after he failed field sobriety and portable breathalyzer tests.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-223 (West Supp. 2006), his driver's license was

1

suspended for ninety days. R. 1. He requested a hearing to challenge the suspension, as
permitted by section 53-3-223(6), which was held July 28, 2005. R. 63. The hearing
officer ultimately upheld the suspension of Beller's license. R. 1,63. On judicial review
in district court by trial de novo, Third District Court Judge Tyrone Medley affirmed the
license revocation in a Memorandum Decision and Order entered June 7, 2006.
Addendum A. Beller timely appealed, and Rolfe timely cross-appealed to challenge the
ruling on reasonable suspicion.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Salt Lake City Police Officer Jeff Kendrick is a motorcycle cop with more than ten
years' experience who rides a Harley Davidson Road King, R. 79 at 3. Just after
midnight on July 1, 2005, Officer Kendrick was stopped at the side of the street with
Officer Martinez, whom he was training. Officer Martinez was assisting another officer
in a northbound traffic stop and arrest at 831 South 300 West in Salt Lake City. R. 79 at
4. Officer's Kendrick's attention was drawn to two passing motorcyclists, traveling
together, who accelerated southbound, i.e., on the other side of the street. The sound
coming from the muffler of one motorcycle was "extremely loud" and, as the motorcycle
passed by, he saw that it had blue lights illuminating the engine. R. 79 at 4. Asked to
compare the sound of the noisy motorcycle, driven by appellant Beller, to the sound from
his own Harley, Officer Kendrick replied:
Well, the Harley's got a louder tone than say a Honda with a stock
exhaust, but this particular motorcycle was extremely loud. It was loud

2

enough that you could hear, you know, a block away, and that's not typical
of a regular stock equipped muffler on a Harley Davidson.
j ^ 79 a t 4. Officer Kendrick did not know for certain the make of Beller's motorcycle,
though it looked like his own. R. 79 at 13. He did not pursue Beller at this time because
he was required to stay with his trainee, Officer Martinez, absent egregious
circumstances. R. 79 at 8.
Five or ten minutes later, the same two motorcyclists passed by Officer Kendrick
again, this time going northbound and passing very close to one of the officers'
motorcycles at the side of the street. R. 79 at 5. Officer Kendrick believed the sound
from Beller's muffler was excessively loud and in violation of Salt Lake City Ordinance
12.28.100,1 which prohibits alteration or replacement of a stock muffler to make the
motorcycle's sound louder; he wanted to stop Beller because he thought the excessive
muffler noise violated the law. Id. He made his assessment of the unusual loudness of
Beller's motorcycle by relying on his own ears and on his experience, including that with

'Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.28.100 (R.65) provides:
Every motor vehicle shall at all times be equipped with a muffler in
good working order and in constant operation. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, no person shall modify the exhaust system of a motor vehicle in
a manner which will amplify or increase or change the character of the
noise emitted by the motor of such vehicle above that emitted by the
muffler originally installed on the vehicle. No person shall sell, furnish,
provide or purchase, nor shall any person attach to any vehicle any device
which will or is intended to increase or change the character of the sound of
the original muffling equipment on any motor vehicle. No person shall
operate a motor vehicle with an exhaust system so modified.
3

motorcycles generally, but not on any device that registered the decibel levels of the
sound coming from Beller's motorcycle. R. 79 at 6-7, 12. He also believed the blue
lights on Beller's motorcycle engine violated a city ordinance that prohibits adding
lighted equipment, Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.28.090. R. 79 at 7.
This time Officer Kendrick pursued the two motorcyclists, riding up behind and
between them at the stop sign on 400 West and 700 South. R. 79 at 10-11. He instructed
Beller's companion to pull over to the right. Id. at 11. At this point, according to Officer
Kendrick, Beller spoke up: "Hey, you know, we're just going a couple of blocks away.
I'm with county." Officer Kendrick replied, "Okay, but I want to talk to you about your
muffler. Why don't you go and wait across the street for me." R. 79 at 11.
Although Officer Kendrick did not know when he stopped Beller what the factory
specifications were for the muffler and lights on Beller's particular motorcycle, he did
know that no manufacturer makes motorcycles with the "super trap style" muffler like
that on Beller's. R. 79 at 12. He added:
When I say super trap style, they've actually got the discs that are added to
the end of the exhaust, and you can change the discs depending on how
loud you want it or depending on how much performance you want that
motorcycle to have, so it's adjustable. I'm not aware of any muffler for
street use that uses that style of muffler.
The other thing that drew my attention was there were spark plugs
mounted in the muffler itself with wires that went back into the bag or
undercarriage of the motorcycle.
Id.

4

Beller stipulated at trial that Officer Kendrick smelled alcohol when he crossed the
treet and approached Beller a short time later. Addendum A, R. 64; Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order, Addendum B, R. 24-25. He also saw Beliefs glassy,
bloodshot eyes, and relaxed facial features. Beller admitted to Officer Kendrick that he
Tiad been drinking alcohol that evening, then performed poorly on all three field sobriety
tests Officer Kendrick administered (Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus, Walk and Turn, and
One Leg Stand). After Beller failed the portable breath test, he was arrested for driving
under the influence of alcohol. He took an intoxilyzer test at 1:55 a.m. and the result was
.097, above the legal limit of .08 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. See Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6a-502 (West Supp. 2006). Officer Kendrick gave him a DUI summons and
notice of the Division's intent to suspend his license for ninety days, a consequence
mandated by section 53-3-223(3).
Beller requested an administrative hearing to challenge the suspension. See Utah
Code Ann. § 53-3-223(6) (West Supp. 2006). He was represented at this hearing by
counsel. No one was present at the administrative hearing on behalf of the Driver
License Division ("the Division") or its director, appellee Nanette Rolfe. See Addendum
C, CD Recording of Administrative Hearing.2 The hearing officer ultimately upheld the
2

The Court can take judicial notice of the record of this administrative proceeding.
Moore v. Utah Technical College, 727 P.2d 634, 638 n. 17 (Utah 1986) (taking judicial
notice of administrative rules and regulations as well as published accounts of
administrative proceedings and actions); Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch,
Inc., 758 P.2d 451, 456 (Utah App.) (noting Utah appellate courts may judicially notice
the record of proceedings below for the first time on appeal if it would support affirming
the district court decision below), cert, denied, 769 P.2d 819 (Utah 1988); Riche v. Riche,
5

suspension, rejecting Beller's contention that Officer Kendrick lacked probable cause for
the traffic stop or the DUI arrest. R. 1, 63.
Beller then filed a petition for review by trial de novo in the district court, claiming
the suspension was based on "arbitrary and capricious acts of agents o f the Division and
asking for reinstatement of his license. R. 2. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-14, 15(1 )(a)
(West 2004); Utah Code Ann § 53-3-224 (West 2004). Based on Beller's motion and the
stipulation of Rolfe's counsel, an order was entered reinstating Beller's driving privileges
during the pendency of judicial review. R. 14-15. Other than appellee Rolfe's proposed
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order (included here as Addendum B, R. 2 3 27), no other motions or pleadings were filed prior to trial on January 9, 2006.
The arresting officer, the only trial witness, testified about the reasons for the
traffic stop. See Transcript, R. 79. (As already noted, Beller stipulated to Rolfe's
proposed factual findings from the stop onward. Addendum B, R. 24-25.) Beller put on
no evidence, made no motion to suppress, and made no closing argument. Instead, he
asked to submit a post-trial memorandum, with Rolfe allowed to respond to it, and this
request was granted. R. 79 at 14-15.

784 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah App. 1989) ("Courts may take judicial notice of the records and
prior proceedings in the same case."); see Utah R. Evid. 201(b)-(c) (West 2006). This is
apparently what the Utah Supreme Court did in Badger v. Brooklyn Canal, 922 P.2d 745,
751-52 & n.l 1 (Utah 1996). Alternatively, the Court can take judicial notice of the
hearing recording as a public record. See Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, ^
31 n.8, 84 P.3d 1134; Utah R. Evid. 803(8) (public records hearsay exception).
6

In his post-trial memorandum, captioned "Memorandum in Support of Petition to
Reinstate Drivers [sic] License/' Beller asserted that his Fourth Amendment rights were
violated because Officer Kendrick stopped him without reasonable suspicion of an
offense. R. 32-39. First, he argued Officer Kendrick was mistaken in his belief that the
blue lights on the side of the engine of Beller's motorcycle violated any law, since only
light visible from the front of the motorcycle is prohibited. See Salt Lake City Ordinance
12.28.090. R.36-37. Second, he claimed Officer Kendrick could not have reasonably
suspected that Beller's muffler was modified in contravention of Salt Lake City
Ordinance 12.28.100 because the officer did not know the make and model of Beller's
motorcycle or the factory specifications for the original equipment on Beller's
motorcycle. R. 38. As a consequence, Beller's memorandum concluded, "the subsequent
detention was constitutionally unreasonable and Petitioner asks that his driver's license be
reinstated accordingly." R. 39.
In her responsive memorandum, Rolfe noted that Beller was belatedly attempting
to suppress evidence of Beller's drunk driving by invoking the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule. R. 41. She argued that the relevant statute, Utah Code Ann. § 53-3223(6), does not require a determination of the legality of the traffic stop that led to an
arrest for DUI and that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply in the
civil administrative proceedings to revoke a driver's license. If, on the other hand, the
legality of the stop is relevant to the license revocation, Rolfe contended, Officer
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Kendrick had a reasonable suspicion that Beller's extremely loud muffler had been
modified in violation of city ordinance. R. 42-48.3
In reply, Beller contended that the Division had waived any argument about the
irrelevance of the constitutionality of the traffic stop by not raising it at the administrative
hearing. He also argued, for the first time, that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
is applicable to driver's license revocation proceedings. R. 53-59. No oral argument was
held on these issues. R. 61.
The district court entered its memorandum decision and order on June 7, 2006.
Addendum A, R. 62-69. Judge Medley concluded that Officer Kendrick lacked
reasonable suspicion that Beller had committed any traffic violation, required by the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, but that the exclusionary rule does not apply in
driver's license hearings.4 Adhering to Ballard v. State, 595 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Utah
1979), Judge Medley also concluded that license revocation proceedings are remedial and
not quasi-criminal, R. 67-68, a conclusion Beller does not challenge on appeal.

3

Appellee Rolfe did not pursue any argument concerning the blue lights Officer
Kendrick saw on the motorcycle engine.
4

Beller erroneously suggests that the trial court also based its ruling on the state
exclusionary rule that safeguards Utah Constitution, article I, § 14 interests. Br. of Aplt.
at 5, 9, 11, 18. Although Judge Medley mentioned the state constitution in his ruling,
Addendum A at 6, R. 67, the record clearly shows Beller made no argument in the trial
court concerning this state constitutional provision or a state exclusionary rule. Instead,
his arguments related only to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. See Point III,

infra.
8

Accordingly, the district court affirmed the Division's order revoking Beller's license and
lifted the stay on its implementation. Addendum A, R. 62-69.
ISSUES ON APPEAL/ STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1

By failing to raise them at the Driver License Division hearing, did appellant

Beller waive the issues of whether the exclusionary rule applies in driver's license
proceedings to exclude evidence of Beller's intoxication because Officer Kendrick lacked
reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop?
This waiver issue is decided in the first instance by the appellate court; thus, there
is no standard of review. See Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah
1998); Badger v. Brooklyn Canal, 922 P.2d 745, 751 (Utah 1996). Preservation of the
waiver issue in the trial court by appellee Rolfe was not necessary. Brown & Root
Industrial Serv. v. Industrial Comm 'n, 947 P.2d 671, 677 (Utah 1997).
2.

Does the waiver doctrine preclude the Division from arguing, as respondent at the

trial de novo, that the legality of Officer Kendrick's stop of Beller is irrelevant in the
driver's license revocation context because the federal exclusionary rule is inapplicable
there?
Application of the waiver doctrine presents an issue of law reviewed for
correctness. See, e.g., Brinkerhoffv. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah App. 1990)
(petitioner who failed to timely object at driver's license hearing waived right to raise
issues on judicial review).

9

3. By failing to raise it in the trial court, did Appellant waive the issue of whether a state
exclusionary rule applies in driver's license proceedings to protect either Fourth
Amendment or Utah Constitution article I, section 14 interests?
This waiver issue is decided in the first instance by the appellate court; thus, there
is no standard of review.
4. Do Utah statutes, specifically section 41-6a-521 or section 53-3-223, incorporate the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement for traffic stops that culminate in license
revocation proceedings for driving while impaired?
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness with
no deference to the trial court's ruling. Gutierrez v. Medley, 972 P.2d 913, 914-15 (Utah
1998); Ellison v. Stam, 2006 UT App 150, % 16, 136 P.3d 1242, 1246.
5.

Should this Court vacate the trial court's unnecessary determination of whether

Officer Kendrick had reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop of Beller?
This issue presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See State ex rel
A.R., 1999 UT 43, ^ 13, 982 P.2d 73, 77: World Peace Movement of America v.
Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 257 (Utah 1994); State v. Webster, 2001 UT
App 238, U 30 n.8, 32 P.3d 976, 985. It arises for the first time in the trial court's
memorandum decision, but Rolfe contended below that the constitutional legality of the
traffic stop need only be reached if Judge Medley determined that the exclusionary rule
was applicable. R. 46.
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6.

If the Court reaches the issue of the constitutionality of the traffic stop, did Officer

Kendrick have reasonable suspicion to believe that the extremely loud muffler on Better's
motorcycle had been modified in violation of the city ordinance?
Appellant misstates the applicable standard of review, arguing that the trial court's
determination of whether there was reasonable suspicion is a factual finding overturned
on appeal only if clearly erroneous. Br. of Aplt. at 1, 6. A trial court's determination of
Fourth Amendment reasonableness, however, is a question of law reviewed for
correctness, with no deference by the appellate court to the trial court's application of this
legal standard to the historical facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ^ 15, 103 P.3d 699,
703; see State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, % 8, 112 P.3d 507, 509. This issue was
preserved for cross-appeal in Appellee's memorandum. R. 46-48.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The text of Utah Code Ann. §§ 53-3-223, 41-6a-502, and 41-6a-521 is included in
Addendum D. The text of the relevant ordinance is included in the body of the brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
At the informal adjudication before the Division, Appellant argued only that the
arresting officer lacked probable cause. Because this was insufficient to preserve issues
concerning a lack of reasonable suspicion and the applicability of the exclusionary rule in
driver's license proceedings, the trial court should not have addressed them on judicial
review. In contrast, the Division was not required by the waiver doctrine to argue at the

11

informal adjudication that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is inapplicable there,
even if Appellant had raised the subject
Before this Court, Appellant argues that a state exclusionary rule rendered
inadmissible all evidence of his drunken driving obtained after an unconstitutional traffic
stop. This issue was not preserved for appeal because it was never presented to the trial
court; instead only the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule was invoked.
The plain language of Utah's statutes governing license suspension for impaired
driving reveals they do not incorporate a Fourth Amendment probable cause standard
before an officer may stop a driver or administer sobriety tests.
The trial court improperly determined the constitutional issue of whether the traffic
stop was supported by reasonable suspicion required by the Fourth Amendment. This
issue should not have been addressed, given the trial court's determinative,
nonconstitutional ruling that the exclusionary rule does not apply in driver's license
proceedings.
If the exclusionary rule does apply, the Court should reverse the trial court because
Officer Kendrick articulated sufficient specific, objective facts constituting reasonable
suspicion for the traffic stop. Because of the extremely loud sounds coming from the
muffler on Appellant's motorcycle, as well as the aftermarket muffler modifications the
officer saw on the muffler, the traffic stop to investigate a suspected equipment violation
satisfied the Fourth Amendment.

12

ARGUMENT
I. SELLER WAIVED THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE BARS EVIDENCE OF HIS
INTOXICATION IF THERE WAS NO REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR THE
TRAFFIC STOP
Appellant Beller contends the Inal una! crroncuir.K concluded that the
exclusionary rule does in H I MI r. nlnirr nl his intoxication garnered by police who
stopped i
I HI

>ouable suspicion of a traffic violation *V *>\ -.
r

did IRA .ai^e ihese matters during the informal r i

u -,re the

Division's hearing officer. Beller, who petiiiont/d lm jiiihunl icview of the agency's
decision by trial de novo, fheivbv \v;m ul «mv arguments about reasonable suspicion and
application ol ihr I'utttlh Amendment exclusionary rule in driver's license hearings.
It is axiomatic that "issues not raised in proceedings rare not subject to judicial rex .c Industrial Serw v hhlash u
limokhnt

-

,

i it \ e agencies

umstances. Brown & Root

/, ^4/ i\2d 671, 677 (Utah 1997); accord Badger v.

Mini i '</., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (('fall 1998); Pease v. Industrial ( omm n r u

oi J, 610 vLiaii i^N-h
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.;.

-•

\s the Utah Supreme Court has held lin\ nai\ei doctrine

is so basic and necessary to on,.

'" --vlv objection in |,ippdlu

\ul enforce it despite the lack of a

"• 'lie district court]." Brown & Root, 947 P.2d at 677- see

als* * /V/ -nkerhoff, 790 P.2d at 589 (applying waiver doctrine in dm or IICCHM. hearing
• -- without mention of any objection by Division ai (JK; (rial ik imui HI district court),
in order to preserve an issue foi i\v www \\H\H ul w i e w in the trial court, a party
aggrieved by the agenc\ \s ai u« »h ill* i FI- informal adjudicative proceeding, like those
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before the Division, must have raised an issue to the agency adjudicator's "level of
consciousness." Badger, 966 P.2d at 847; U.S. Express, Inc. v. State Tax Comm '/?, 886
P.2d 1115, 1119 n.7 (Utah App. 1994); Brinkerhoff, 790 P.2d at 589. This preservation
requirement has been applied against aggrieved parties seeking judicial review of
driver's license revocations since at least 1990. In Brinkerhoff, this Court held that the
trial court had erroneously addressed, on petition for de novo review, issues alluded to,
but not properly raised, by the petitioner driver during informal adjudication before the
Division. 790 P.2d at 589 & n.3.
Here, the only argument made by Beller before the administrative hearing officer
was in the 29-second closing by his counsel at the informal adjudicative hearing:
With due respect to the officer, I don't think that there was probable
cause to stop Mr. Beller for any traffic violation, even though he, his
muffler may be loud that is not necessarily a violation under Salt Lake City
ordinances. The blue lights are certainly not. He was able to drive his
vehicle without incident. He was driving within the speed limit. I
respectfully submit that there's not probable cause to stop him for not
only any traffic violation but to believe he was driving under the influence.
Addendum C at 21:57-22:26 (emphasis added). No mention was made of "reasonable
suspicion" or a lack of it, and no legal authority was offered for either what constitutes
reasonable suspicion or how it is assessed by the courts. Moreover, there was no motion
to suppress evidence, no mention of the exclusionary rule or its applicability in this civil
administrative proceeding, no legal authority tendered for its applicability there, and no
argument about the effect its application would or should have on the outcome of the
administrative proceeding. Counsel's argument, quoted above, is simply insufficient to
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preserve any Fourth Amendment issue about the exclusionary rule or about reasonable
suspicion for the traffic stop. See, e.g., Barney v. Utah Dep't of Commerce, 885 P.2d 809
(Utah App. 1994) (concluding general objection at administrative hearing to the conduct
of the proceeding, with no motion made to address alleged specific deficiencies, is
insufficient to preserve due process claim for judicial review).
As this Court is well aware, a traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment if based on the officer's articulable, reasonable suspicion or probable cause
that a driver has violated any applicable traffic or equipment regulations. State v. Lopez,
873 R2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994); State v. Yazzie, 2005 UT App 261, % 7, 116 PJd 969,
971; see State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 225 (Utah App. 1995) (concluding an
equipment violation justified an investigative stop). "Reasonable suspicion" is a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped has committed such a
violation. Yazzie, 2005 UT App. 261, ^f 7. In contrast, probable cause requires more: it
exists where "'the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which
they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed."
State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah App. 1990) (emphasis added) (quoting Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949)); accord State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ffll
17-18,137 P.3d 787, 791-92 (probable cause standard is one of reasonable belief). Of
course, a "reasonable belief would exist if the officer actually observed a traffic offense,
but an observed offense is not required for a constitutional traffic stop. Lopez, 873 P.2d
15

at 1132. "Stopping a vehicle may also be justified when the officer has 'reasonable
articulable suspicion that the driver is committing a traffic offense . . . . " ' Id. (quotation
omitted); accord State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, % 26, 78 P.3d 590, 597 ("Traffic stops are
analogous to Terry stops, which are justified on the basis of reasonable suspicion rather
than probable cause.").
Officer Kendrick never claimed at the administrative hearing that he had probable
cause to arrest Appellant for violating ordinances governing muffler modification or
additional lights; instead, he stopped Beller because he suspected such violations based
on what he heard and saw. See Addendum C. Nonetheless, Beller argued there only that
the police lacked probable cause to believe either that he had committed a traffic offense
or that he was driving under the influence. Under well-established law in Utah, even if
the hearing officer had agreed with Beller that Officer Kendrick lacked probable cause
for the traffic stop, the stop was nonetheless lawful (and the evidence adduced therefore
admissible under the Fourth Amendment) if it was supported by reasonable suspicion,
which Beller never contested at the administrative hearing.
"[T]he failure to make known the nature of one's rights in the course of an
administrative proceeding clearly disentitles a party from raising its claim for the first
time before a district court on de novo review." Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d
745, 751 (Utah 1996). Because Appellant did not argue at the administrative level that,
because Officer Kendrick lacked reasonable suspicion of an equipment violation, the
exclusionary rule should apply to exclude evidence of his intoxication obtained after the
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purportedly unconstitutional traffic stop, these issues were not preserved for judicial
review. Thus, the trial court erroneously addressed them on judicial review and this
Court should decline to consider them on appeal. Brown & Root, 947 P.2d at 677;
Badger, 966 P.2d at 847; Brinkerhoff, 790 P.2d at 589-90.
II. THE DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION, RESPONDENT IN THE DISTRICT
COURT TRIAL DE NOVO, WAS NOT REQUIRED TO "PRESERVE" ITS
LEGAL ARGUMENTS AT THE INFORMAL ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING
Beller contends the Division should have been barred from arguing the
inapplicability of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to driver's license
proceedings. He argues that the Division waived this issue by not raising it before the
hearing officer during the informal adjudicative hearing. Br. of Aplt. at 10. Appellee
Rolfe urges the Court to reject this misuse of the waiver doctrine embodied in Badger,
966 P.2d at 847, as it has no support in Utah law or in sound public policy.
First, neither Badger nor any other precedent applies the waiver doctrine to bar a
respondent agency from raising arguments in a district court action filed pursuant to
section 63-46b-15(2) to review final agency action after informal adjudication. All the
cases apply it against the petitioner in district court and bar issues and arguments the
petitioner did not preserve by raising them first in the administrative proceeding. E.g.,
Badger, 966 P.2d at 845; Brinkerhoff, 790 P.2d at 589; Barney, 885 P.2d at 809. Indeed,
the Utah Supreme Court contemplates that the waiver doctrine will only hobble those
parties who petition for judicial review of agency action: "[A] party seeking review of
agency action must raise an issue before that agency to preserve the issue for further
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review." Badger, 966 P.2d at 847 (emphasis added). With regard to preservation of
issues at informal agency adjudications, the Court adopted the "level of consciousness"
test, "requiring a plaintiff [petitioner] to bring an issue to the fact finder's attention so that
there is at least a possibility that it could be considered." Id.; see also S&G, Inc. v.
Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1990) ("persons aggrieved by decisions of
administrative agencies" may not bypass the agency hearing and seek judicial resolution
of issues).5
Second, Beller's argument is contrary to public policy choices already made by the
Utah Legislature, which has created administrative agencies to resolve many disputes
between the government and its citizens outside the judicial system. Informal
proceedings are authorized for numerous types of administrative adjudications, including
driver's license matters. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4 (West 2004). According to the
Driver License Division's Annual Report for FY 2006, there were 14,138 arrests in Utah
for driving under the influence. During the same year, the Division's hearing officers
conducted 4,044 hearings related to driver's license suspensions or revocations after DUI
arrests or convictions, hearings that are not attended by Division staff or counsel.
If the waiver doctrine applies to the agency itself when it is respondent on judicial
review, the Division will have to send an assistant attorney general to every alcohol-

applying the Badger waiver doctrine to petitioners in de novo actions, but not to
respondents there, is consistent with the appellate courts' practice of affirming on any
alternative ground supported by the record, even if never raised in the trial court by
appellee. See State v. Jarman, 1999 UT App 269, \ 5 n.2, 987 P.2d 1284, 1286.
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related hearing to respond to a driver's legal arguments with its own and to defend the
constitutionality of the traffic stop and any DUI arrest-as well as the validity of field
sobriety tests and portable breathalyzer results-in order to prevail at any subsequent trial
de novo in district court on judicial review.6 All other agencies (such as the Water
Engineer and the Tax Commission) will be required to do the same at any informal
adjudications they conduct in order to prevent their final agency actions from being
automatically overturned on de novo judicial review. Neither the Utah Legislature nor
the appellate courts have ever contemplated such a complication of the informal
administrative adjudication process under UAPA.
For these reasons, the Court should affirm Judge Medley's implicit decision not to
apply the waiver doctrine against the Division, respondent in the district court proceeding,
to bar its argument that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply in driver
license proceedings.
III. BY FAILING TO RAISE IT IN THE TRIAL COURT, APPELLANT
WAIVED ANY ARGUMENT CONCERNING THE APPLICABILITY OF A
STATE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN DRIVER'S LICENSE PROCEEDINGS
Judge Medley concluded that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not
apply in in driver's license revocation proceedings, which are civil, not quasi-criminal,
and of a remedial, not punitive, nature. R. 66-67. Beller does not argue otherwise on

6

Although the Division is respondent at these trials de novo, it nonetheless bears
the burden of proof. Pledger v Cox, 626 R2d 415, 417 (Utah 1981).
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appeal.7 Instead, he argues that a state exclusionary rule applies at the administrative
hearing to exclude evidence obtained pursuant to a traffic stop that is unsupported by
reasonable suspicion and, thus, in viokition of either the Fourth Amendment or Utah
Constitution, article I, § 14. Br. of Aplt. at 5, 11-19 (Argument IIB, captioned "THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE OF ARTICLE I, § 14 APPLIES.").
As noted above, a lack of reasonable suspicion was not raised by Beller at the
administrative hearing, nor did he claim any violation of the Utah Constitution. Likewise,
no mention was made there of any state exclusionary rule. Thus, Beller could not have
raised these matters in the trial court on de novo judicial review because they were
waived. See Brown & Root, 947 P.2d at 677; Badger, 966 P.2d at 847; Pease, 694 P.2d
at 616.

7

The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to extend the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule to civil proceedings. See Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation v.
Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998) (holding exclusionary rule is inapplicable to adult parole
proceedings); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) (declining to extend
exclusionary rule to civil tax proceedings); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 34952 (1974) (declining to apply exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings); State ex rel.
A.R., 1999 UT 43,1j 20, 982 P.2d 73, 78 (holding exclusionary rule does not apply in
child protection proceedings); State v. Jarman, 1999 UT App 269, \ 7, 987 P.2d 1284,
1286 (holding exclusionary rule does not apply in adult probation revocation
proceedings). The only exception is Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693
(1965), in which the exclusionary rule was held applicable in a nominally civil forfeiture
proceeding that was found to be quasi-criminal in nature because of its punitive purpose.
The Utah Supreme Court has already held that license revocation proceedings are
intended to protect the public, not to punish, and that they are not quasi-criminal. Ballard
v. State, 595 P.2d 1302, 1304-05 (Utah 1979); see generally Michelle L. Hornish, Note,
Excluding the Exclusionary Rule, 65 Mo. L. Rev. 533, 542 (2000) (concluding that a
majority of states does not apply the exclusionary rule in administrative license hearings).
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Just as importantly, however, no argument was raised by Beller in the trial court
concerning any alleged violation of article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution, or of the
applicability of a state exclusionary rule to exclude evidence obtained after an
unconstitutional traffic stop. Neither topic was argued, analyzed, suppoited ot * vcn
mentioned at trial, R. 79, or in his post-trial memoranda, included here as Addendum E.
"Absent plain error or extraordinary circumstances, we do not address issues raised
for the first time on appeal." Bd, of Trustees v. Keystone Conversions, LLC, 2004 UT 84,
% 32 n.8, 103 P.3d 686, 694; accord State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1 I I U1 Kali 1994)
(declining to address state due process claim not presented to trial court). No plain error
or extraordinary circumstances have been claimed or demonstrated here.
Because Beller failed to argue below that a state exclusionary rule rendered
inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the state or federal constitutions, he
has waived the issue.8
TV UTAH STATUTES GOVERNING DRIVER'S LICENSE REVOCATION FOR
DUI DO NOT REQUIRE TRAFFIC STOPS OR REQUESTS FOR SOBRIETY
TESTS TO SATISFY FOURTH AMENDMENT STANDARDS
Without identifying it as a separate issue, Beller suggests that the statutes
governing revocation of the licenses of those who drive while impaired incorporate a
Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard applicable to a traffic stop that ultimately
reveals impaired driving, as well as the effectuating federal exclusionary rule. Br. of

8

This same issue has been argued by appellant in Pearce v. Rolfe, No. 20060539CA, in which the State's responsive brief is currently due January 18, 2007.
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Aplt. at 15, 17, 19. According to Beller, the requirement in sections 41-6a-521(3) and
53-3-223(6)(c) that a license revocation hearing address whether there were "reasonable
grounds" to believe the driver was operating a vehicle while impaired is "fairly read as
permitting inquiry into Fourth Amendment issues." Br. of Aplt. at 15.
To buttress this argument, Beller claims that license revocation hearing officers
"have historically and routinely permitted inquiry into the bases for traffic stops
.. . and have refrained from revoking licenses in cases involving Fourth Amendment
violations.. . ." Id. at 17. Beller also describes the alleged "standard practice of applying
the exclusionary rule" in revocation proceedings, which he contends should be continued.
Id. at 18. There is no support in the record for these self-serving claims. The record
material repeatedly cited by Beller, R. 53-55, consists solely of the unsupported argument
of Belter's counsel in his post-trial memorandum, which is not evidence. State ex rel
Division of Forestry, Fire & State Lands v. Six Mile Ranch Co., 2006 UT App 104, ^j 31
n.10, 132 P.3d 687, 697 (concluding argument of counsel is not evidence). There is no
evidence in the record of any such practices at the revocation hearings.
In any event, in determining whether Utah statutes incorporate the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness requirement for traffic stops as well as administration of
sobriety tests, this Court must "give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the
plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." Utah State Tax
Comm 'n v. Stephenson, 2006 UT 84, ^f 32,

P.3d
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. Other interpretive tools,

including the agency's implementation of a statute, are only appropriate if tin sudik
itself is ambiguous. See id. No such ambiguity is present here.
The legislature has clearly articulated the public safety purpose of Utah's Driver
License Act:
Purpose of revocation or suspension for driving under the influence.
The Legislature finds that the purpose of this title relating to suspension or
revocation of a person's license or privilege to drive a motor vehicle for
driving with a blood alcohol content above a certain level or while under
the influence of alcohol, any drug, or a combination of alcohol and any
drug, or for refusing to take a chemical test as provided in Section 41-6a520, is protecting persons on highways by quickly removing from the
highways those persons who have shown they are safety hazards.
Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-222 (West Supp. 2006); see also Ballard, 595 P.2d at ; 30:> ("The
administrative [license] revocation proceedings are to protect the public, not to punish
individual drivers."). Under sections 41-6a-521 and 53-3-223(6), a person whose license
is being revoked for driving while impaired can request a hearing before the Division.
"The hearing . . . shall cover the issues of: (i) whether a peace officer had reasonable
grounds to believe the person was driving a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6a502 [prohibiting driving with more than set concentration of alcohol in one's blood or
breath] or 41-6a-517 [prohibiting driving with any measurable amount of controlled
substance in the body.]" Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-223(6)(c)(i) (West Supp. 2006). The
language of section 41-6a-521(3)(a) is almost identical, only adding sections 41-6a-530
(providing that alcohol restricted drivers may drive with no "measurable or detectable
amount of alcohol" in their bodies), 53-3-231 (prohibiting persons under 21 from driving
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with any measurable alcohol in their bodies), and 53-3-232 (prohibiting "no alcohol
conditional" licensees from driving with any alcohol in their bodies).
Under the plain language of the statutes, the revocation hearing must inquire into
whether "a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving" while
impaired by unlawful levels of alcohol or drugs. The statutes do not require any inquiry
into the grounds for a traffic stop that ultimately discloses impaired driving, nor do they
require anything more than "reasonable grounds" even for the officer's belief that the
driver is impaired. No mention is made of the Fourth Amendment, the Constitution, the
exclusionary rule, or the constitutional standards of "reasonable suspicion" or "probable
cause."
Reller's unsupported claim that the legislature really meant "Fourth Amendment
probable cause" when it said "reasonable grounds" in these statutes, Br. of Aplt. at 15, is
frivolous. Notwithstanding anomalous arrest statutes that have been modified by case law
to require probable cause for an arrest,9 the legislature is fully capable of employing the
discrete term "probable cause" to carry out its intent when it means to. A Westlaw search
of this term yields 78 statutory usages in Utah.
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court long ago defined "reasonable grounds" for a
police officer's belief that a person is driving while impaired under Utah's statutes:

9

Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-7-2, -3 (West 2004).
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[T]he officer must h&ve a reasonable basis for his belief that the person
requested to submit to a chemical test was driving or in actual physical
control of the motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.
"Reasonable grounds" exist where the facts and circumstances within the
officer's knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy
information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that the situation exists.
Ballard, 595 P.2d at 1306 (footnotes omitted). Notably, in providing this definition of the
statutory term, the Court did not rely on the Fourth Amendment or federal case law
interpreting it.
Most states that have considered the question have refused to read into their civil
license revocation statutes a requirement that the officer's traffic stop or request for
sobriety tests pass constitutional muster. E.g., Nevers v. State Dep 7 of Admin., 123 P.3d
958, 962-63 (Alaska 2005); Tornabene v. Bonine ex rel Arizona Highway Dep't, 54 P.3d
355, 363 (Ariz. Div. App. 2002); Fishbein v. Kozlowski, 743 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Conn.
1999); Powell v. Secy of State, 614 A.2d 1303, 1305-06 (Me. 1992); Riche v. Director of
Rev., 987 S.W.2d 331, 333-336 (Mo. 1999); Chase v. Neth, 697 N.W.2d 675, 684 (Neb.
2005); Beavers v. State Dep 7 Motor Vehicles & Public Safety, 851 P.2d 432, 438 (Nev.
1993); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Wysocki, 535 A.2d 77, 79 (Pa. 1987).
A few states have interpreted their own revocation statutes otherwise, usually
based on the distinctive language of their statutes. See People v. Krueger, 567 N.E.2d
717, 721 (111. App. 2d Dist. 1991); Olson v. Comm r of Public Safety, 371 N.W.2d 552,
553 (Minn. 1985); Watford v. Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 61A N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ohio
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1996); Pooler v. Motor Vehicles D/v., 755 P.2d 701, 702-03 (Ore. 1988); State v. Lussier,
757 A.2d 1017, 1018, 1020 (Vt. 2000) (premised on state constitution).
No case law, however, adopts the radical statutory construction proffered by
Beller, Br. of Aplt. at 15, which would equate "reasonable grounds" in sections 41-6a-521
and 53-3-223(6) with Fourth Amendment probable cause before an officer could carry out
a traffic stop or administer sobriety tests. This would impose a more stringent standard
than the Fourth Amendment does,10 crippling traffic enforcement as well as drunk driving
enforcement. There is simply no basis for concluding that the Utah Legislature intended
this bizarre result when it provided that an officer must have "reasonable grounds" to
believe a person is driving while impaired.
The trial court thus correctly declined to read the term "reasonable grounds" in
sections 41-6a-521 and 53-3-223(6) as incorporating a Fourth Amendment probable cause
standard for the predicate traffic stop or for the suspicion of impaired driving.
V. A RULING ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS
IMPROPER IN LIGHT OF THE TRLVL COURT'S DETERMINATIVE, NONCONSTITUTIONAL CONCLUSION THAT THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE DOES
NOT APPLY IN DRIVER'S LICENSE HEARINGS
It is well-established that a constitutional question "is not to be reached if the
merits of the case in hand may be fairly determined on other than constitutional issues."
Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 2002 UT 42, ^ 21, 48 P.3d 941, 947 (citation and quotation
omitted); accord State ex rel A.R., 1999 UT 43, ^ 13, 782 P.2d 73, 77; KD. v. A.B., 2003

]

See discussion at 14-15, supra, of the Fourth Amendment standards.
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UT App 215,1} 10 n.3, 73 R3d 971, 973; State v. Rodriguez, 2002 UT App 119, % 4,46
P.3d 767, 768; State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238, % 30 n.8, 32 P.3d 976, 985; State v.
Jarman, 1999 UT App 269, % 5, 987 P.2d 1284, 1286.
State ex rel A.R. is particularly instructive since it involved a similar issue to the
one presented here. In it, the Utah Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies in child protection proceedings to exclude
evidence obtained in a search by police that was allegedly conducted in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. The juvenile court had not addressed the constitutional
reasonableness of the warrantless home entry in A.R. because of its determinative
conclusion that, in any event, the exclusionary rule did not apply in child welfare
proceedings. 1999 UT 43,11f 2, 12 n.6.
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed that legal conclusion about the
exclusionary rule, but also determined that the warrantless search violated the Fourth
Amendment. Id. ^9. On certiorari review, the Utah Supreme Court first addressed the
applicability of the exclusionary rule to child protection proceedings, adding: "Only if the
rule does apply in this context is it necessary to determine whether the warrantless
searches constituted a Fourth Amendment violation." Id. % 13; accord Jarman, 1999 UT
A

PP 269, % 5, 987 P.2d 1284, 1286 (citing State ex rel A.R. and noting court need not

reach merits of constitutionality of a search of a probationer if the exclusionary rule is
^applicable to adult probation revocation proceedings). The court in Jar man,
concluding the exclusionary rule does not apply to adult probation revocation
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proceedings, never addressed the constitutionality of the search. Likewise, in State ex rel
A.R., the Utah Supreme Court never reached the constitutional issue: "Because we have
held the exclusionary rule inapplicable in child protective proceedings, it is unnecessary
to consider in this case whether the searches by police officers were unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment." 1999 UT 43, % 23.
Here, as in State ex rel. A.R., inapplicability of the exclusionary rule is a nonconstitutional basis on which to reject Beller's efforts to exclude at the trial de novo
evidence of his intoxication. See Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524
U.S. 357, 362-63 (1998) (exclusionary rule is prudentially-created means of deterring
Fourth Amendment violations, not a constitutionally-mandated one); Jarman, 1999 UT
App 269, ^f 6 (same). The reasonable suspicion issue, on the other hand, does present a
constitutional question. See, e.g., Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1131-32.
Although the trial court concluded that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable in
driver's license hearings, it first addressed whether the traffic stop was unconstitutional
for lack of reasonable suspicion. Addendum A, R. 64. The court's analysis is backwards.
Whether the traffic stop comported with the Fourth Amendment was irrelevant once, as
the trial court concluded, the evidence of Beller's driving under the influence was
admissible regardless of whether Officer Kendrick had reasonable suspicion for the
traffic stop. In light of the overwhelming precedent directing courts to avoid gratuitous
determination of constitutional questions, the trial court erred in addressing the matter of
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reasonable suspicion despite its determinative resolution of the case based on the
exclusionary rule issue.
For this reason, the Court should vacate that portion of the trial court's opinion
concerning whether there was reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop.
VI. OFFICER KENDRICK ARTICULATED SPECIFIC, OBJECTIVE FACTS
CONSTITUTING REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT BELLER'S MOTORCYCLE MUFFLER VIOLATED A CITY EQUIPMENT REGULATION
If the Court determines not to vacate the trial court's ruling on reasonable
suspicion, it should nonetheless reverse Judge Medley's erroneous conclusion that it was
lacking here.
A police officer is justified in stopping a vehicle "when the officer has 'reasonable
articulable suspicion that the driver is committing a traffic offense.. . .' [A]s long as an
officer suspects that the driver is violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic
and equipment regulations, the police officer may legally stop the vehicle." Lopez, 873
P.2d at 1132 (quotations and citations omitted). Reasonable suspicion determinations
turn on the facts known to the officer at the time of the stop. Id. at 1137 n.6.
Here, Officer Kendrick articulated more than enough objective facts to constitute
reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop of Beller. Officer Kendrick was a veteran
motorcycle cop on traffic control, with ten years of experience. He had two opportunities
to assess the volume of Beller's motorcycle-once when it passed him on the other side of
the street and once when it passed very close to the officers on the northbound side of the
street. Officer Kendrick testified that Beller's motorcycle, which looked like his own
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Harley Davidson Road King, was "extremely loud." It was so loud he could heard it a
block away, which the officer opined is louder than a stock-equipped muffler on a Harley.
The loud volume of Beller's exhaust could have, by itself, provided Officer Kendrick
with reasonable suspicion of an equipment violation. See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 2002
WL 1000298, 2002 UT App 163 (concluding that a "loud clicking noise" emanating from
defendant's vehicle as it passed provided reasonable suspicion of violation of an
equipment regulation, justifying the traffic stop) (Addendum F); see also South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976) (noting that police routinely stop vehicles if
violations, such as "excessive noise," are noted); United States v. Vanness, 342 F.3d
1093, 1098 (10th Cir. 2003) (officers who stopped a car emitting loud music objectively
and reasonably relied on a local ordinance prohibiting "unreasonable noise"); United
States, v. Johnson, 463 F.2d 70, 71 (10th Cir. 1972) (noting, without comment, that police
stopped defendant's car for operating in violation of noise ordinance).
But, in addition to what he heard, what Officer Kendrick saw on Beller's bike as
he pulled up to the two motorcyclists at the stop sign on 400 West and 700 South
supported his initial suspicion that the exhaust system had been modified. He saw an
aftermarket modification, a "supertrap style" muffler on Beller's bike, and he knew of no
motorcycle manufactured with such a device, which has adjustable discs that allow the
volume of the exhaust to be modified. And he saw spark plugs mounted in the muffler
itself, with wires going to the undercarriage, an unusual configuration also suggesting that
the muffler system had been modified after manufacture. Both observations, coupled
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with what the officer considered, in his experience, to be an usually loud exhaust noise
for a motorcycle, provided him with reasonable suspicion that Beller was violating Salt
Lake City Ordinance 12.28.100, which prohibits modification of the originally installed
exhaust system to amplify its sound, as well as riding a vehicle so modified.
Beller argued, and Judge Medley agreed, that Officer Kendrick could not form
such a reasonable suspicion unless he had a decibel meter or knew the make or model of
Keller's motorcycle, as well as the bike's factory specifications and the kind of muffler
originally installed on it. R. 36, 38, 65; Br. of Aplt. at 6.11 There is, however, no legal
support for these arguments, which would require an officer to know-and not just
reasonably suspect-that a muffler modification has been made. Reasonable suspicion is
assessed based on the totality of circumstances before the officer, who need not know for
certain that there has, in fact, been an equipment regulation violation.12
Officer Kendrick articulated specific, objective facts that gave him a reasonable
suspicion of an equipment violation on Beller's motorcycle. Thus, the trial court's
judgment upholding the Division's suspension of Appellant's license should be affirmed,
albeit on the alternative ground that the traffic stop was not unconstitutional. See Jar man,

u

Contrary to Beller's counsel's representation, R. 36, 38, accepted by Judge
Medley, R. 65, the transcript shows Officer Kendrick did not testify that he believed
Beller's bike was custom-made.
l2

What the officer learns after a valid traffic stop can, of course, dispel any
reasonable suspicion, requiring the officer to cease detention of the driver. E.g., State v.
Chism, 2005 UT App 41, ^ 17 & n.9, 107 P.3d 706, 711.
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1999 UT App 269, ^ 5 n.2, 987 P.2d 1284, 1286 (appellate court can affirm on any legal
ground or theory apparent on the record).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellee Rolfe asks the Court to affirm the Division's
revocation of Better's license by: (a) vacating that portion of the trial court's judgment
addressing the constitutional reasonableness of the traffic stop; (b) declining to address
the issues of the officer's reasonable suspicion and applicability of the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule because of Appellant's failure to raise them in the
administrative proceeding; (c) declining to address the state exclusionary rule issue
because it was waived by Appellant's failure to raise it in the trial court; and (d)
concluding that the Utah civil statutes governing revocation of licenses of impaired
drivers do not incorporate a Fourth Amendment probable cause standard.
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Although most of the issues raised by appellant have been waived and the
remaining issue on appeal is not complex, the cross-appeal issues regarding reasonable
suspicion are important enough to merit oral argument and a published opinion for the
benefit of the bench and bar.
Respectfully submitted this 12

day of January, 2007.

ANNINA M. MITCHELL
Utah Solicitor General
Attorney for Appellee/Cross-Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT were mailed, with first-class postage prepaid, this
h,

day of January, 2007, to the following Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant/Cross-

Appellee:
Ronald Yengich
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ,
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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ADDENDUM A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CURTIS J. BELLER

;

Petitioner,

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CASE NO. 050913807

VS.

NANETTE ROLFE, Director, Utah State
Driver License Division
:
Respondent.

:

Before the Court is petitioner's Petition seeking review of the
suspension of his drivers license and driver privileges.
appeared and was represented by Ronald J. Yengich.

Petitioner

Respondent appeared

through Rebecca D. Waldron, Assistant Attorney General. The Court having
heard and considered the evidence, stipulations of the parties and
arguments, being fully advised in the premises, enters this Memorandum
Decision.
BACKGROUND
In the early morning hours of July 1, 2005, petitioner and a
companion passed by Officer Kendrick {"Kendrick") on separate motorcycles
traveling on the opposite side from where Kendrick was stationed.
Kendrick later stated that he thought that the motorcycles sounded
unusually loud.

When petitioner passed for the second time, this time

on the near side of

the street, Kendrick pulled petitioner over.

Kendrick also noticed that the engine of the motorcycle was lighted.

PAGE 2
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Kendrick later testified that he believed that petitioner had
violated two separate ordinances. First, he believed that petitioner was
operating a vehicle in violation of either a Salt Lake City or State
ordinance governing the type of lighting a vehicle may have; and second,
because he believed that petitioner was operating his motorcycle in
violation of Salt Lake City Ordinance § 12.28.100, which prohibits
modification of an exhaust system of a motor vehicle in such a manner as
will amplify, increase, or change the character of the noise emitted by
a motor of such vehicle above that emitted by the muffler originally
installed on the vehicle.
Upon approaching

and questioning petitioner, Officer

Kendrick

observed that petitioner appeared intoxicated. The field sobriety tests
and intoxilyzer results confirmed

this observation. Petitioner was

arrested for operating his motorcycle under the influence of alcohol.
An administrative hearing to determine whether petitioner's license
should be suspended followed on July 28, 2005.

As a matter of routine,

the hearing officer apparently inquired into whether the stop was legal,
but ultimately decided to suspend petitioner's license based upon the
evidence obtained at the scene and thereafter.
Petitioner appealed the decision in the present action, asserting
that the suspension was arbitrary, capricious and without due process of
law.
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It should be noted initially, both counsel stipulated to the facts
and corresponding

conclusions of law as described

in respondent's

proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, beginning after the
initial stop of petitioner.

The parties' stipulation is incorporated

herein by this reference.
ANALYSIS
Legality of the Stop
Petitioner maintains that Officer Kendrick violated petitioner's
Fourth Amendment rights of the United States Constitution because the
traffic stop was not justified at its inception, and Officer Kendrick
lacked reasonable suspicion that petitioner was violating the law. State
v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), Provo Citv v. Warden. 844 P.2d 360
(Utah App. 1992).
In the instant case, the Court finds from a totality of the
circumstances that Officer Kendrick lacked reasonable suspicion that
petitioner was violating the law. Officer Kendrick testified he stopped
petitioners' motorcycle because the sound of the muffler was extremely
loud and that the engine was illuminated by blue lights.

Officer

Kendrick's detention of petitioner would not have been justified by the
lights which illuminated the engine, based upon his failure to articulate
whether the lights could be seen from in front of the motorcycle or
whether the lights were located on the side of the motorcycle, which
would not constitute

a violation of

the law.

Officer Kendrick's

BELLER V. ROLFE
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testimony regarding the engine illumination is unclear and cannot alone
support a reasonable suspicion that petitioner committed a traffic or
equipment violation.
Officer Kendrick further testified that petitioner's motorcycle
muffler was extremely loud and was suspected to be modified.

Officer

Kendrick based his suspicion upon his experience with motorcycles, yet
other than riding a Harley Davidson Road King, the record is noticeably
lacking any specificity describing Officer Kendrick's experience, such
as how many years he owned and operated motorcycles?

How is Officer

Kendrick familiar with the sound of original and modified motorcycles?
Officer Kendrick testified that at the inception of the stop, he could
not identify the make or model of petitioner's motorcycle, nor its
factory specifications. Other than Officer Kendrick's experience, which
was not detailed, he had no other objective means of determining the
decibels of petitioner's motorcycle. Officer Kendrick could not with any
degree of reliability form a reasonable suspicion that petitioner's
muffler

had been

unlawfully

modified.

Finally,

Officer

Kendrick

testified he believed petitioner's motorcycle was custom made, that he
did not know the bike's specifications, nor what kind of muffler was
originally installed, therefore, Officer Kendrick could not form a
reasonable suspicion the petitioner violated Salt Lake City Code §
12:28.100.
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Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule
The crux of petitioner's contention is that the initial stop was not
based upon reasonable articulable suspicion, and was therefore illegal.
Accordingly, the argument follows, the evidence was obtained following
the stop pursuant to an unreasonable search and seizure, in violation of
the 4th and 14th amendments to the United States Constitution.

By

operation of the exclusionary rule, the suspension of driving privileges
which flowed from that stop must be reversed.

The issue which this

argument presents to the Court is whether the exclusionary rule applies
to DLD hearings—which are civil in nature, but often result—as was the
case here—in the deprivation of rights or privileges.

In a sense, as

further analyzed below, the question really is whether the DLD hearings
are civil, or quasi-criminal in nature.

As applied to driver license

revocation or suspension hearings, this is a matter of first impression
in this state, and the parties concede that nationally, authorities are
split.1
Despite the novelty of this precise issue, both of Utah's appellate
courts have consistently held that the exclusionary rule does not apply
in civil cases.

x

See In re: A.R. and C.P., 1999 UT 43, 982 P.2d 73

While there is a split on this particular issue, at least one
writer believes that there is a majority view: "a majority of states
do not apply the exclusionary rule in administrative license
hearings." See Michelle L. Hornish, Note, Excluding the Exclusionary
Rule, 65 Mo. L. Rev. 533, 542 (2000).
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(holding the exclusionary rule inapplicable to civil child protection
proceedings); State of Utah v. Jarman, 1999 UT App. 269, 987 P.2d 1284
(probation revocation proceedings).
However, it is equally clear that, at least under the protection of
the Utah State Constitution, the exclusionary rule applies to quasicriminal proceedings.
(Utah 1992)

(reasoning

See, Simms v. Utah State Tax Comm'n 841 P.2d 6
that

illegally obtained evidence

should be

excluded from a civil proceeding if the proceeding is in effect criminal
or if the exclusion is necessary to deter future unconstitutional
searches).2
While petitioner contends that the revocation or suspension of his
driver's licence was a criminal sanction, he fails to support this
contention with relevant Utah case law. Instead, he turns to cases from
other jurisdictions which hold that a legal search and seizure is a
necessary predicate to introduction of challenged evidence in a driver's
licence suspension proceeding.

This ignores Utah's clear stance that

"while we agree . . . that the right to drive is a
valuable right or privilege and it cannot be taken
away without procedural due process, we do not
agree that revocation proceedings are therefore
necessarily criminal or quasi-criminal in nature."

2

Simms was a 2-1-2 plurality opinion, however, the one justice
concurring in the result agreed with the plurality's opinion that the
tax penalty at issue in that case was in effect criminal.

LER
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v. State, 595 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Utah 1979).
Cox,

598 p

-2d

133

See also. Holman v.

1 ("This Court has made clear that license revocation

proceedings, as such, are civil in nature and that constitutional rights
afforded defendants in a criminal proceeding do not extend to those
proceedings") .
These cases are equally clear that the administrative consequences
which flow from driving under the influence of alcohol are remedial, and
not punitive in nature:
The purpose of this administrative procedure is not
to punish the inebriated drivers; such persons are
subject to separate criminal prosecution for the
purpose of punishmentThe administrative
revocation proceedings are to protect the public,
not to punish individual drivers.
Ballard, at 1305.

Indeed, as the legislature states in its purpose for

enacting the restriction:
The Legislature finds that the purpose of this
title relating to suspension or revocation of a
person's license or privilege to drive a motor
vehicle for driving with a blood alcohol content
above a certain level or while under the influence
of alcohol . . . is protecting persons on highways
by quickly removing from the highways those persons
who have shown they are safety hazards
Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-222 (2006).
Based upon the clear weight of authority, because the Courts of this
state uniformly consider a drivers' license revocation proceeding to be
a civil action and not a quasi-criminal action, the exclusionary rule
does not

apply.

Therefore,

based

upon

the

parties'

stipulation
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referenced hereinbefore and respondent's consideration of the evidence
obtained at the scene in reaching her decision to suspend petitioner's
license was not arbitrary and capricious.

Accordingly, petitioner's

claim is hereby dismissed and the previously ordered stay of suspension
of petitioner's license is hereby lifted.

This constitutes the final

Order of the Court on the matters referenced herein.
is required.
Dated this

No further Order

^
/

day of June, 2006 >

E. MEDLEY
CT COURT JUDGE

/• /£i
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this
2006:

Ronald J. Yengich
Attorney for Petitioner
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Rebecca Waldron
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

/

day of June,
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
CURTIS JOSHUA BELLER,
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On July 1, 2005 Officer Kendrick observed Petitioner operating a motorcycle at or
near 831 South and 300 West in Salt Lake City. As the Petitioner drove by southbound on 300
West, Officer Kendrick noted that the motorcycle had an extremely loud altered exhaust, and
blue lights emitting from under the gas tank. When the Petitioner drove by Officer Kendrick a
second time, this time northbound on 300 West, a few minutes later, Kendrick initiated a traffic
stop at about 831 South on 300 West.
2. Upon approaching the Petitioner, Officer Kendrick noted the odor of alcohol and
observed that Petitioner had glassy, blood shot eyes and relaxed facial features. The Petitioner
further admitted to having consumed alcohol that evening.
3. Officer Kendrick requested that Petitioner perform field sobriety tests. Officer
Kendrick instructed and demonstrated the field sobriety tests to Petitioner. On the Horizontal
Gaze nystagmus (HGN) test, Officer Kendrick noticed that both of Petitioner's eyes laked
smooth pursuit, had nystagmus at maximum deviation and the onset of nystagmus prior to 45
degrees. During the Walk and Turn test Petitioner stepped out of the starting position during the
instruction phase, started too soon, stopped walking, made an improper turn, raised his arms for
balance, missed the heel to toe, and stepped off the line. During the One Leg Stand test,
Petitioner swayed, raised his arms, and hopped on counts 17 and 27. The portable breath test
was positive for alcohol.

2

4. Officer Kendrick came to the conclusion that Petitioner was under the influence of
alcohol to the degree that he was unable to safely drive a motor vehicle, and arrested Petitioner
for driving under the influence of alcohol based on Petitioner's driving pattern, odor of alcohol*
repetitive speech, glassy blood shot eyes, relaxed facial features, admission to consuming alcohol
and Petitioner's poor performance on the field sobriety tests.
5. Officer Kendrick read Petitioner the chemical test admonitions off of the DUI report
form, then requested that Petitioner take a breath test, which Petitioner agreed to do.
6. Officer Kendrick checked Petitioner's mouth pursuant to the "Baker" rule at least
fifteen minutes before the intoxilyzer test. He observed nothing in Petitioner's mouth. Petitioner
was in Officer Kendrick's presence from the time he first observed "Baker" until Petitioner blew
into the intoxilyzer.
7. Officer Kendrick was certified to operate the Intoxilyzer 5000. He operated the
machine according to the operational checklist. The time of the test was 1:55 a.m. The result
was .097 breath alcohol.
8. The machine was working properly and had a maintenance check on May 18, 2005
and June 2,2005.
9. Petitioner was handed a copy of the DUI Summons and Citation which gave him
notice of the Driver License Division's intent to suspend his license for 90 days.

3

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondent has met its burden of proof and shown by a preponderance of the evidence
that:
1. Officer Kendrick had reasonable grounds to believe Petitioner was driving a motor
vehicle in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-502 based on the following: Petitioner's
driving pattern, odor of alcohol, repetitive speech, glassy blood shot eyes, relaxed facial features,
admission to consuming alcohol and Petitioner's poor performance on the field sobriety tests.
In addition, Petitioner admitted to drinking that evening.
2. The Intoxilyzer was maintained and working properly.
3. Petitioner had a Breath Alcohol Content (BAC) of over the legal limit of .08.
4. Petitioner was served with notice of the Driver License Division's intent to suspend or
revoke his license.

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Petitioner's Petition is denied.
2. The revocation of Petitioner's driving privilege for a period of ninety days effective
July 31,2005 is affirmed.
3. The September 13, 2005 stay of the suspension of his license is lifted as of the date of
this order.
Dated this

day of

, 2005
BY THE COURT:

Honorable Tyrone E. Medley
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing PROPOSED FINDINGS
OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER, postage prepaid, on thifcy^ day of
November, 2005, to the following:
Ronald J. Yengich
175 E. 400STE400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

^tf^
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ADDENDUM D

41-6a-502. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both or with
specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration.
(1) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this state if the person:
(a) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent chemical test shows that the
person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test;
(b) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any
drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or
(c) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of operation or
actual physical control.
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of
blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210
liters of breath.
(3) A violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance similar to this section
adopted in compliance with Section 41-6a-510.

41-6a-521. Revocation hearing for refusal — Appeal.
(1) (a) A person who has been notified of the Driver License Division's intention to revoke the
person's license under Section 41-6a-520 is entitled to a hearing.
(b) A request for the hearing shall be made in writing within ten calendar days after the day on
which notice is provided.
(c) Upon request in a manner specified by the Driver License Division, the Driver License
Division shall grant to the person an opportunity to be heard within 29 days after the date of arrest.
(d) If the person does not make a request for a hearing before the Driver License Division under
this Subsection (1), the person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle in the state is revoked
beginning on the 30th day after the date of arrest for a period of:
(i) 18 months unless Subsection (l)(d)(ii) applies; or
(ii) 24 months if the person has had a previous:
(A) license sanction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years from the date of
arrest under Section 41-6a-517, 41-6a-520, 41-6a-530, 53-3-223, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232; or
(B) conviction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years from the date of arrest
under Section 41-6a-502 or a statute previously in effect in this state that would constitute a
violation of Section 41-6a-502.
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), if a hearing is requested by the person, the
hearing shall be conducted by the Driver License Division in the county in which the offense occurred,
(b) The Driver License Division may hold a hearing in some other county if the Driver License
Division and the person both agree.
(3) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of:
(a) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that a person was operating a
motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6a-502, 41-6a-517, 41-6a-530, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232; and
(b) whether the person refused to submit to the test or tests under Section 41-6a-520.
(4) (a) In connection with the hearing, the division or its authorized agent:
(i) may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the
production of relevant books and papers; and
(ii) shall issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace officers.
(b) The Driver License Division shall pay witness fees and mileage from the Transportation
Fund in accordance with the rates established in Section 78-46-28.
(5) (a) If after a hearing, the Driver License Division determines that the person was requested to
submit to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to the test or tests, or if the person fails to
appear before the Driver License Division as required in the notice, the Driver License Division
shall revoke the person's license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in Utah beginning on the
date the hearing is held for a period of:
(i) 18 months unless Subsection (5)(a)(ii) applies; or
(ii) 24 months if the person has had a previous:
(A) license sanction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years from the date of
arrest under Section 41-6a-517, 41-6a-520, 41-6a-530, 53-3-223, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232; or

(B) conviction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years from the date of arrest
under Section 41-6a-502 or a statute previously in effect in this state that would constitute a
violation of Section 41-6a-502.

(b) The Driver License Division shall also assess against the person, in addition to any fee
imposed under Subsection 53-3-205(13), a fee under Section 53-3-105, which shall be paid
before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative costs.
(c) The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed court decision following a
proceeding allowed under Subsection (2) that the revocation was improper.
(6) (a) Any person whose license has been revoked by the Driver License Division under this
section may seek judicial review.
(b) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a trial.
(c) Venue is in the district court in the county in which the offense occurred.

53-3-223. Chemical test for driving under the influence — Temporary license — Hearing
and decision — Suspension and fee — Judicial review.
(1) (a) If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person may be violating or has
violated Section 41-6a-502, prohibiting the operation of a vehicle with a certain blood or breath
alcohol concentration and driving under the influence of any drug, alcohol, or combination of a
drug and alcohol or while having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a
controlled substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6a-517, the peace officer
may, in connection with arresting the person, request that the person submit to a chemical test or
tests to be administered in compliance with the standards under Section 41-6a-520.
(b) In this section, a reference to Section 41-6a-502 includes any similar local ordinance adopted
in compliance with Subsection 41-6a-510(l).
(2) The peace officer shall advise a person prior to the person's submission to a chemical test that
a test result indicating a violation of Section 41-6a-502 or 41-6a-517 shall, and the existence of a
blood alcohol content sufficient to render the person incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle
may, result in suspension or revocation of the person's license to drive a motor vehicle.
(3) If the person submits to a chemical test and the test results indicate a blood or breath alcohol
content in violation of Section 41-6a-502 or 41-6a-517, or if a peace officer makes a
determination, based on reasonable grounds, that the person is otherwise in violation of Section
41-6a-502, a peace officer shall, on behalf of the division and within 24 hours of arrest, give
notice of the division's intention to suspend the person's license to drive a motor vehicle.
(4) (a) When a peace officer gives notice on behalf of the division, the peace officer shall:
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the driver;
(ii) issue a temporary license certificate effective for only 29 days from the date of arrest; and
(iii) supply to the driver, in a manner specified by the division, basic information regarding how
to obtain a prompt hearing before the division.
(b) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if provided in a manner specified by the division,
also serve as the temporary license certificate.
(5) As a matter of procedure, a peace officer shall send to the division within ten calendar days
after the day on which notice is provided:
(a) the person's license certificate;
(b) a copy of the citation issued for the offense;
(c) a signed report in a manner specified by the division indicating the chemical test results, if
any;and
(d) any other basis for the peace officer's determination that the person has violated Section 416a-502or41-6a-517.
(6) (a) Upon request in a manner specified by the division, the division shall grant to the person
an opportunity to be heard within 29 days after the date of arrest. The request to be heard shall be
made within ten calendar days of the day on which notice is provided under Subsection (5).
(b) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (6)(b)(ii), a hearing, if held, shall be before the division
in the county in which the arrest occurred.
(ii) The division may hold a hearing in some other county if the division and the person
1. both agree.
(c) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of:
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving a motor
vehicle in violation of Section 41-6a-502 or 41-6a-517;

(ii) whether the person refused to submit to the test; and
(iii) the test results, if any.
(d) (i) In connection with a hearing the division or its authorized agent:
(A) may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the
production of relevant books and papers; or
(B) may issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace officers.
(ii) The division shall pay witness fees and mileage from the Transportation Fund in accordance
with the rates established in Section 78-46-28.
(e) The division may designate one or more employees to conduct the hearing.
(f) Any decision made after a hearing before any designated employee is as valid as if made by
the division.
(g) After the hearing, the division shall order whether the person's license to drive a motor
vehicle is suspended or not.
(h) If the person for whom the hearing is held fails to appear before the division as required in
the notice, the division shall order whether the person's license to drive a motor vehicle is
suspended or not.
(7) (a) A first suspension, whether ordered or not challenged under this Subsection (7), is for a
period of 90 days, beginning on the 30th day after the date of the arrest.
(b) A second or subsequent suspension for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years
under this Subsection (7) is for a period of one year, beginning on the 30th day after the date of arrest.
(8) (a) The division shall assess against a person, in addition to any fee imposed under
Subsection 53-3-205(13) for driving under the influence, a fee under Section 53-3-105 to cover
administrative costs, which shall be paid before the person's driving privilege is reinstated. This
fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed division hearing or court decision that
the suspension was not proper.
(b) A person whose license has been suspended by the division under this section may file a
petition within 30 days after the suspension for a hearing on the matter which, if held, is
governed by Section 53-3-224.
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

RONALD J. YENGICH #3580
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Petitioner
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-0320
Fax: (801) 364-6026
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALTLAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CURTIS J. BELLER,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF PETITION TO REINSTATE
DRIVERS LICENSE

Petitioner,

Case No. 050913807
NANETTE ROLFE, Director, Utah
State Driver License Division,
JUDGE TYRONE E. MEDLEY
Respondent.

Comes now the Petitioner, Curtis Beller, by and through his counsel of record,
Ronald J. Yengich, who hereby submits this memorandum in support of his petition to reinstate
his drivers license.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
On July 1, 2005, at approximately 12:50 a.m., Officer Kendrick (hereinafter Kendrick)
was assisting a fellow officer on a traffic stop near 700 South 300 West, Salt Lake City, Utah.
He first heard what he considered to be a loud muffler coming towards his position from the

south. He then observed two motorcycles traveling together on the other side of the street. At
that time he could not determine which motorcycle was making the loud sound. In addition, he
could not identify the make or model of either vehicle. He did not pursue the motorcycles at that
juncture.
A few minutes later, Kendrick saw the motorcycles heading south along 300 West
approaching his position. He was alerted because one of the motorcycles, importantly it was not
the vehicle driven by Petitioner, passed close to Officer Martinez's police motorcycle. Kendrick
stated that his main concern was with the manner in which the other vehicle was being driven.
He did not initially begin his pursuit because of concern as to Petitioner's muffler. Nonetheless,
at this time, he believed that the sound coming from Petitioner's bike was louder than that which
he would expect from an unmodified muffler system. However, Kendrick could not identify the
make or model of Petitioner's motorcycle and he believed that it looked like it was custom made.
Kendrick conceded that he was not familiar with the factory specifications of all motorcycles. He
also noted that the motorcycle's engine was illuminated by blue lights located on the side of the
vehicle.
Kendrick pursued both motorcycles. He did not observe any traffic violations or other
notable driving pattern as he followed Petitioner. He caught up with them at an intersection
where Petitioner and his companion were stopped at a stop sign. He told Petitioner's companion
to pull over and get off his bike. He also told Petitioner to pull to the other side of the road.
Kendrick proceeded to conduct field sobriety tests and Petitioner was arrested for DUI. His
license was subsequently suspended for 90 days and he subsequently filed the instant appeal.

2

ARGUMENT
L

DEFENDANT'S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WERE
VIOLATED WHERE OFFICER KENDRICK SEIZED HIM
WITHOUT REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT AN OFFENSE HAD
OCCURRED.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution was created to protect
individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. Amend. IV. "The United
States Supreme Court held that 'stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute^]
a seizure within the meaning of [the Fourth Amendment], even though the purpose of the stop is
limited and the resulting detention is quite brief.'" State v. Matinson, 875 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah
App. 1994)(citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). In order for a traffic stop to
be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the police officer's action must be justified at its
inception and the resulting detention must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
that justified the interference in the first place. Id. (citing State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-32
(Utah 1994)).
Specific situations in which police officers are justified in making stops
citizens in their vehicles include the following:
(1) When the officer observes the driver commit a traffic violation;
(2) When the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver
committing a traffic offense, such as driving under the influence of alcohol
driving without a license; and
(3) When the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver
engaged in more serious criminal activity, such as transporting drugs.
Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah App. 1992).

of

is
or
is

Regarding the first justification, the traffic violation must be committed in the officer's
presence. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132.1 Consequently, if the officer did not observe the underlying
offense, then "the stop [is J not justified at its inception and the evidence derived from it must be
suppressed." Id. at 1134. Regarding the second and third justifications, unlike the first, an
officer is justified in stopping a vehicle when he has a reasonable articulable suspicion that the
driver is committing a more serious traffic offense, such as driving under the influence of alcohol
or driving without a license, or, that the driver is engaged in more serious criminal activity, such
as transporting drugs. Matinson, 875 P.2d at 586-87 (emphasis added). In these circumstances
Utah courts have recognized that reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify the stop. Id. ("A
stop is also 'justified when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is
committing a traffic offense, such as driving under the influence of alcohol or driving without a
license...[or that] the driver is engaged in more serious criminal activity, such as transporting
drugs.'") (quoting Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132); State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 141 (Utah App.
1997) ("a police officer is justified in stopping a vehicle... when the officer has a reasonable
articulable suspicion that the driver committed or is about to commit a crime, such as
transporting drugs."); Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah App. 1992) ("police
officers are justified in making stops... when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion

1

The court in Lopez quoted the United States Supreme Court saying, "as long as an officer suspects that the 'driver
is violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations,' the police officer may legally
stop the vehicle." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 citing Delegare v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979). However, in
Lopez, the court ultimately remanded the case back to the trial court to determine whether the defendant did, in fact,
make a left turn without signaling. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1134.

that the driver is committing a traffic offense, such as driving under the influence of alcohol or
driving without a license").
In the instant case, Kendrick violated Petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights because the
traffic stop was not justified at its inception. While Defendant recognizes that this determination
is highly fact sensitive, given the totality of the circumstances, Kendrick lacked reasonable
suspicion that Petitioner was violating the law.
Kendrick stated that he believed that Petitioner committed two traffic violations: his
motorcycle's engine was illuminated and he believed that the muffler was loud. In the instant
case, where the engine was illuminated by lights located on the side of the bike, the lighting did
not constitute a violation of law. Kendrick was mistaken as to the law's requirements in this
regard. In reference to the alleged muffler violation, Kendrick lacked reasonable^uspicipn that it
had been modified. Kendrick could not identify the make or model of the bike, he could not
identify its factory specifications, and therefore, he could not determine whether it had been
modified. Furthermore, the fact that Kendrick believed that Petitioner was riding a custom bike
indicates that reasonable suspicion was lacking. A custom bike could be manufactured with
almost any muffler configuration. Therefore, Kendrick could not determine whether Petitioner's
muffler had been modified to any degree of reliability.

A. The Illumination of Petitioner's Engine Was Not in Violation of Law
Kendrick mistakenly believed that the illumination of Petitioner's engine violated Salt
Lake City Ordinance §12.28.090. That section reads in pertinent part as follows:

(A) No person shall drive, move, stop or park, nor shall the owner or person in
possession cause or knowingly permit to be driven, moved, stopped or parked on
any street or alley, any vehicle . . .
(2) Which is not equipped with those serviceable lamps, reflectors, brakes, horn
and other warning and signaling devices, windows, windshields, windshield
wipers, mirrors, mufflers, fenders, tires, and other parts and equipment in the
position, condition and adjustment meeting the requirements of the laws of the
state as to such parts and equipment...
(4) Which is of such size, weight or condition, or is loaded or equipped in such
manner as is in violation of the laws of the state with respect to such vehicle
(B) No person shall do any act forbidden or fail to perform any act required by the
laws of the state relating to tires, lamps, brakes, fenders, horns, sirens, whistles,
bells and other parts and equipment....
Salt Lake City Code §12.28.090. Therefore, there is not any specific requirement announced in
the foregoing section concerning the illumination of the engine. Rather, one must look to the
State Code to determine whether engine illumination on the side of a vehicle constitutes a
violation of law. Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-1604 governs lamps and vehicle illumination; however
it does not address illumination of an engine. Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-1616 regulates the use of
colored lights and reads in pertinent part as follows:
(2) Except for an authorized emergency vehicle and a school bus, a person may
not operate or move any vehicle or equipment on a highway with a lamp or device
capable of displaying a red or blue light that is visible from directly in front of the
center of the vehicle.
Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-1616. Kendrick stated that he believed it was a violation to
illuminate the engine of Petitioner's motorcycle.

However, it was clear that any

illumination was on the side of the bike, and not on the front. Therefore, no violation
occurred regarding the illumination of the engine on Petitioner's bike.

£

B. Kendrick Lacked Reasonable Suspicion That Petitioner's Muffler Violated the Law
Kendrick also stated that he believed that Petitioner committed a violation
regarding the state of his muffler. Salt Lake City Code §12.28.100 regulates the use of
mufflers on a vehicle and states that no person shall modify the exhaust system of a
motor vehicle in a manner which will amplify, increase, or change the character of the
noise emitted by a motor of such vehicle above that emitted by the muffler originally
installed on the vehicle. Salt Lake City Code §12.28.100. In the instant case, where
Kendrick could not identify the make or model of Petitioner's motorcycle and believed
that it was custom made, he could not determine what kind of muffler was originally
installed. Where Kendrick conceded that he did not know factory specifications for all
bikes, he could not know the specifications of Petitioner's bike at the time the muffler
was originally installed. Furthermore, Kendrick stated that he believed Petitioner was
riding a custom bike. Where Kendrick believed that the bike was custom made, he could
not know what kind of muffler was originally installed. It logical conclusion is that
Kendrick could not know whether the muffler was modified, and, in the absence of such
information, he lacked reasonable suspicion in this regard. As reasonable suspicion was
lacking, Kendrick was not authorized to conduct a traffic stop.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Kendrick lacked reasonable suspicion to support the traffic
stop in this case. Consequently, the subsequent detention was constitutionally unreasonable and
Petitioner asks that his driver's license be reinstated accordingly.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3

day of February, 2006.
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant

By
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Assistant Attorney General
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CURTIS J. BELLER
Petitioner,

v.

)
)
)
]
)

NANNETTE ROLFE,
Director, Utah State Driver
License Division,

;
)
]

Respondent.

)i

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF REINSTATEMENT
OF DRIVER'S LICENSE

Case No. 050913807AA

JUDGE TYRONE E. MEDLEY

Petitioner, CURTIS J. BELLER, by and through his attorney of record, RONALD
J. YENGICH, hereby submits this response to Respondent's Opposition of Petition to
Reinstate Driver's License.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE RESPONDENT FAILED TO RAISE ANY ARGUMENT
AS TO THE APPLICABILITY OF THE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME AND THEREFORE
WAIVED THE RIGHT TO RAISE SUCH AN ARGUMENT
AT THIS JUNCTURE.

It is well established that claims which have not been properly raised before the
trial court at the appropriate time may be deemed waived. Gibson v. Board of Review of
the Industrial Commission of Utah, 707 P.2d 675, 678 (Utah 1985); Pease v. Industrial

Commission of Utah, 694 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1984).

Rather, to be sufficiently

addressed, a claim must be "submitted to the trial court [in such a manner that] the court
is afforded an opportunity to rule on the issue." Hart v. Salt Lake County Commission,
945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (internal citations omitted). Requiring issues to
be raised at the appropriate time promotes judicial efficiency by alerting the judge to the
issue and allowing the opportunity to address and correct the matter before accepting
otherwise irrelevant evidence. See State v. Holgate, 10 F.3d 346, 349 (Utah 2000); see
also Turtle Management v. Haggis Management, 645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982).
In the instant case, the sole basis for the challenge at issue was the disputed
constitutionality of the initial traffic stop. This was made clear to the Respondent before
any witness was sworn or any evidence admitted. Furthermore, hearing officers routinely
evaluate the propriety of the traffic stop and take no action upon a finding that the stop
was unconstitutional. In this regard, the waiver issue under consideration is analogous to
claims raised for the first time on appeal. It is well accepted that a claim cannot be raised
on appeal unless it was preserved in the trial court. James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799,
801 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); see also Pease at 616. The illegal basis for the traffic stop was
argued by Petitioner at the driver's license hearing and, as is the practice in such
hearings, the officer, a representative and agent of Respondent, considered evidence
going to the constitutionality of the stop.
The argument that Respondent seeks to raise at this juncture was waived in two
respects.

First, where the Driver's License Division routinely considers the

constitutionality of the traffic stop at the initial driver's license hearing, Respondent is
precluded from asserting the subject argument at this time on de novo appeal.

Furthermore, and in the alternative, Respondent should have argued that evidence
concerning the propriety of the stop was irrelevant at the evidentiary hearing before this
Court. The only issue at that hearing was the constitutionality of the stop. By failing to
raise this argument at that time, Respondent is precluded from arguing that the
constitutionality of a stop is irrelevant in relation to a driver's license suspension.
IL

IN
DRIVER'S
LICENSE
HEARINGS,
EXCLUSIONARY
RULE
IS
APPLICABLE
DETERMINE WHETHER A STOP WAS VALID,

THE
TO

The exclusionary rule should be applied to driver's license revocation hearings for
several reasons. First, driver's license hearings are significantly different from other civil
hearings where the exclusionary rule has been deemed inapplicable. Second, while this is
an issue of first impression in Utah, other states have applied the exclusionary rule to
driver's license hearings. Finally, the exclusionary rule has historically been applied to
driver's license hearings in Utah.
A. The exclusionary rule is applicable because driver's license
suspension hearings are unique from other civil hearings.
The Utah Court of Appeals has not ruled directly on the exclusionary rule's
application to revocation proceedings.

Both cases discussed by Respondent are not

directly on point and are easily distinguished. See State v. C.R., 368 Utah Adv. Rep. 32
(Utah 1999) (the exclusionary rule does not apply in child protection proceedings); see
also Penn Bd. Of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998) (the exclusionary
rule is inapplicable in parole proceedings).
The purposes of these other types of hearings are to discuss a child's welfare or a
prisoner's parole possibilities. Even if evidence from an illegal search or seizure were
suppressed from the hearing, the court would still weigh other factors and the analysis
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« .* Hafford

v.

Motor I Jucta,

674 N.E.2d 776 (8th Dist.

Cuyahoga County 1996), (holding a constitutional stop is required in analyzing a license
suspension); People v Krueger, 208 III App. 3d 897 (2d Dist. 1991), (the statute
implicitly requires arrests triggering license suspension must be lawful); Pooler v. Motor
Vehicles D/v., 755 P.2d 701 (Ore. 1988), (defendants can argue validity of the stop);
Brownsberger v. Department of Transp Motor Vehicle Div., 460 N.W.2d 449 (Iowa
1990), (a license revocation proceeding can be reopened if the officer did not have
reasonable grounds for a DUI stop) but see Riche v. Director of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d
331, 334 (Mo. 1999); Powell v. Secretary of State, 614 A.2d 1303, 1307 (Maine 1992).
The Vermont Supreme Court held that a "constitutional stop is a necessary
predicate for a finding that an officer had 'reasonable grounds' to believe a person was
driving while intoxicated". Lussier, 757 A 2d at 1023 (emphasis added). The Court
analyzed the language and purpose of the statute to determine that the Vermont
Legislature must have intended that a constitutionally stop was "a necessary predicate to
finding reasonable grounds for suspicion of DWI because defendants are permitted to
dispute reasonable grounds in the civil suspension proceeding".

Id. at 1020.

It is

illogical that the Legislature would allow a statutorily created right such as breath sample
consent to be argued but ignore the right to be protected from unconstitutional stops. Id
at 23.
Similarly to Vermont, Utah's driver's license revocation hearings consider: a)
whether the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect the defendant was operating under
the influence of alcohol, b) whether the person refused to submit to a chemical test and,
c) the test results. Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-223(6)(c) (emphasis added). Applying the
same logic as the Vermont Supreme Court, it is unlikely that the Utah Legislature would
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to rule the
Respondent's current claim is barred and cannot be considered because it was not
properly raised at the either the initial driver's license hearing or the evidentiary hearing
on de novo appeal. Furthermore, the exclusionary rule should be applied in the
revocation hearing and the Petitioner's license re-instated.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J ^ d a y of March, 2006.

YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Petitioner

By

RONALD J. YENGICH
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c ondiic ted pursiian,t to c ons ent.. I I owe ve r, f 61 a
consent search to be valid, consent must have been
given voluntarily and not have been, "obtained by
police exploitation of... prior illegality.
State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, i 43, 37 P.3d 1073
(citations omitted). Defendant challenges the trial
court's rulings that his consent was voluntar\ and
that it was not obtained through exploitation .; T
prior illegality,. We affirm.

State \ MitchellUtah App..2U<>2.
I NP1 -BUSHED OPINION
CHECK
PC! PS BEFORE CITING
Court of Appeals oi I '!;•
S 1 A IP of fta 1 * Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Michael Eugene MITCHELL, Defendant and
Appellant.
No. 20010473-CA.

We first address
Defendant's consent.

Mi i] "' 16. 2002.,,
Seventh District, IV- -miccllo
Honorable Lyle R. Anderson.

1 Apartment;

The

JACKSON,,

I h VV IS,

and.

MEM.OR ANDUM DECISION < No! I'<M I Kin ml
Publication)
JACKSON, Presiding Judge:
*1 Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of his
motion to suppress FN1 evidence discovered by
Trooper Eldredge following Defendant's consent to
search his vehicle.
FN1. We .. . Hidings ui iact that
underlie the U\J> court's suppression
decision for clear error, and its legal
conclusions based upon those findings for
correctness. See State v. Kohl, 2000 I JT
35,U9,999P.2d7.
Warrantless
v- 1 ' 1 ' the
nit to
lequnenient

searches are per se unconstitutional
Fourth Amendment unless conducted
a recognized exception to the warrant
One such exception includes searches
© 2007 Thomson/West. No CI

i iro!untanne>

FN2. We review "the trial court's ultimate
conclusion that consent was voluntary or
involuntary ... for correctness." Stare \
Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, «; 7. P P.3d
1135.

\\ illiam I Schultz, M'oab, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeffrey S. Gray, Salt I ake
City, for Appellee.
Before
Judges
GREENWOOD.

the

•iiseni
nr-i \< •unitary it it i-> obtained as "the
pioduct ol duress or coercion, express or implied."
1 actors indicating a lack of duress or coercion,
vhich should be assessed in the "totality of all the
urrounding circumstances," include: "1) the
absence of a claim of authority to search by the
Tficers; 2) the absence of an exhibition of force by
the officers; 3) a mere request to search; 4)
cooperation by the ownei of the [property]; and 5)
•ksenre of dei eption or trick on the pan of" die
Bisner, 2001 UT 99 at || 47 (alteration m original)
(citations omitted). Nothing in the record indicates
that '1 rooper Eldredge resorted to a claim of
>nty, an exhibition of force, or deception to
vnuuin Defendant's consent. Moreover, Trooper
Eldredge merely requested Defendant's consent,
explaining several times that he was asking for a
voluntary consent. Furthermore, Defendant signed a
•aivei. after Trooper Eldredge read the waiver to
ami he cooperated by opening the trunk of his
le lor Trooper Eldredge. Thus, the trial court
corrcctK concluded that Defendant's consent was
• •"-Mir

to K >ng. I S. Govt Works.

Not Reported in P.3d
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Not Reported in P.3d, 2002 WL 1000298 (Utah App.), 2002 UT App 163
(Cite as: Not Reported in P.3d)
Next, we consider whether Trooper Eldredge
obtained
Defendant's
voluntary
consent by
exploiting a prior illegality. "In reviewing the
legality of a traffic stop, we consider two questions:
[Wjhether the officer's action was justified at its
inception, and whether it was reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place." State v. Hansen,
2000 UT App 353, U 9, 17 P.3d 1135 (alteration in
original) (quotations and citations omitted).
Defendant first argues that the stop was not justified.
An officer is justified in stopping a vehicle "when
the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that
the driver is committing a traffic offense.... [A]s
long as an officer suspects that the driver is
violating any one of the multitude of applicable
traffic and equipment regulations, the police officer
may legally stop the vehicle." State v. Lopez, 873
P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) (alteration in original)
(quotations and citations omitted). Defendant
challenges the trial court's ruling that the stop was
justified at its inception, arguing that "no traffic
violations, articulable or reasonable suspicion
justifies the stop." However, Trooper Eldredge had
a reasonable and articulable suspicion that
Defendant was violating an equipment regulation,
see Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-117, -155 (1998),
because he heard a "loud clicking noise" emanating
from Defendant's vehicle as it passed. This caused
Trooper Eldredge to believe that Defendant's
vehicle was "obviously not in proper mechanical
order," as if "a wheel [was] about to come off or
something." Thus, the trial court correctly
concluded that the stop was justified.
*2 Next, Defendant asserts that Trooper Eldredge
impermissibly expanded the scope of the stop by "
asking [him] numerous unrelated questions he had
no [ ] business asking" after Trooper Eldredge "
discovered there was no problem such that he would
not let Defendant go with a warning." FN3 Thus, he
argues that although he "eventually consented to the
search, he did so in the course of an illegal seizure."

FN3. Defendant fails to specify of which
questions he complains. However, the
record reflects that the only questions

Trooper Eldredge asked Defendant after he
"let Defendant go with a warning," were to
inquire about what items Defendant was
responsible for in the vehicle.
However, we conclude that Defendant was not
seized for Fourth Amendment purposes after
Trooper Eldredge told Defendant that he was "free
to go." FN4 Thus, there was no seizure when the
questions Defendant complains of were asked and
when Defendant consented to the search.

FN4. The "determination of whether an
encounter with law enforcement officers
constitutes a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment ... is a legal conclusion that
we review for correctness." Salt Lake Citv
v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, U 8, 998 P.2d
274.
"Not every encounter between a police officer and a
citizen is a seizure. A person is seized under the
Fourth Amendment when, considering the totality
of the circumstances, the police conduct would have
communicated to a reasonable person that the
person was not free to decline the officer's requests
or otherwise terminate the encounter and go about
his or her business."
Hansen, 2000 UT App 353 at U 12 (quoting State
v. Higgins, 884 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1994)). In
the present case, Trooper Eldredge returned
Defendant's license and other documents to him, "
[h]anded him the written warning so that he would
feel free and ... told him that he was free to go."
Defendant testified that he then thanked Trooper
Eldredge and asked him, "Is there some place down
here I can get this checked?" Only after this point
did Trooper Eldredge question Defendant about
what he was responsible for in the vehicle and
request consent to search it.
"Examples of circumstances that might indicate a
seizure ... would be the threatening presence of
several officers, the display of a weapon by an
officer, some physical touching of the person of the
citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice
indicating that compliance with the officer's request
might be compelled."

© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

. • >/i 'liiai m \>.MU -,«^.' V\ i 1000 '"Ml 'l.ih \t , I 2002 U I App 163
V^iit its. iNot Reported in i1. W)
State v. PatefielcL 927 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah
Ct.App.1996) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980)).
Nothing in the record suggests that any of these or
similar indicators were present to show that
Defendant was seized for Fourth Amendment
purposes. To the contrary, the totality of the
circumstances indicate that Trooper Eldredge's " '
conduct would [not] have communicated to a
reasonable person that the person was not free to
decline the officer's requests or otherwise terminate
the encounter and go about his or her business.' "
••"<m, 2000 UT App at 1] 12 (citation omitted),
-idingly, the questions Defendant complains of
were not asked during the course of a "seizure,1' as
contemplated by the Fourth Amendment, and
Defendant's " 'consent was not obtained by police
exploitation of [a] prior illegality...1 " Id. at % 18
(citation, omitted),,,,
In summary, Defendant's consent was valid because
it " 'was given voluntarily, and ... was not obtained
by police exploitation of [a] prior illegality/ " Id.
(citation omitted).
*3 Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVTS, Judge and
PAMELA T. GREENWOOD Judn
Utah App.,2002.
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